Theories of reference are a crucial research topic in analytic philosophy. Since the publication of Kripke's Naming and Necessity, most philosophers have endorsed the causal/historical theory of reference. The goal of this paper is twofold: (i) to discuss a method for testing experimentally the causal theory of reference for proper names by investigating linguistic usage and (ii) to present the results from two experiments conducted with that method. Data collected in our experiments confirm the causal theory of reference for people proper names and for geographical proper names. A secondary but interesting result is that the semantic domain affects reference assignment: while with people proper names speakers tend to assign the semantic reference, with geographical proper names they are prompted to assign the speaker's reference.
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Ó 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Since Saul Kripke published Naming and Necessity, most philosophers have endorsed the causal theory of reference. According to this theory, a speaker S refers to an object o by using a name ''N" when she is part of a communication chain that originated with a baptism or a grounding of the name ''N" into the object o and through which information about the object o is transmitted. The crucial point in opposition to the classical descriptivist theory of reference is that the information that the speaker associates to the name might be incomplete, i.e., not detailed enough to single out the bearer of the name or even false of the bearer of the name. In particular, it is not the fact that the speaker associates a true identifying description of the bearer with the name that makes the name refer to the bearer.
The first works in experimental semantics addressed the methodological question concerning the evidence on which philosophers rely to establish which theory of reference is true. The method of cases: the correct philosophical theory of reference for a proper name ''N" is the theory that is best supported by the intuitions that competent speakers have about ''N"'s reference.
This methodological principle presumes that semantic intuitions be uniformly shared among speakers and across actual and possible cases. Machery et al. (2004), Machery, Olivola, and de Blanc (2009) 
